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ŶĚƌĞǁŚĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵŝŶdƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĞƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵ
primarily in opposition to relativism, but in responding to his thought-provoking piece, I would like 
ƚŽĨŽƌĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽƉƉŽƐŝtions, namely particularism. Particularism 
stands most clearly in counterpoint to universalism when the latter is conceptualized as an ethos, or 
prescriptive norm. This kind of conceptualization finds one of its most familiar articulations in the 
CUDOS principles which set out the norms for sound scientific research, and which are derived from 
DĞƌƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚĞůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƌŽŶǇŵ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ
the principle that  “the personal attributes and social background of a person are irrelevant to the 
scientiĨŝĐǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐ ?(Godfrey-Smith 2003, 122). Particularism, in the sense outlined 
by Mitroff (1974, 592), emerges as a kind of reality-check to this ideal P “dŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
characteristics of the scientist are important factors influencing how his work will be judged. The 
ǁŽƌŬŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐǁŝůůďĞŐŝǀĞŶƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽǀĞƌƚŚĂƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?
While Chesterman (2014, 85) argues in favour of this universalist ĞƚŚŽƐ ? “ŝƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŶŽƚĂŚŽŽƚǁŚĞƌe 
these competinŐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵ ? ?, he skirts over its counter-norm, acknowledging 
that ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨ “inƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? (88) come into play in the development of 
standardized terminologies, but otherwise ignoring the current structures of power  W linguistic, 
institutional, economic, political  W that play a crucial role in determining the groups that, in reality, 
contribute to mainstream Translation Studies. This situation has been summarized and commented 
on very cogently ďǇcebnem Susam-Sarajeva (2002). WƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƚŽ
 ‘tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ? ?ƐŚĞ sums up the  ‘ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇ ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ P 
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those periphery researchers who could be heard after all  W at least, to an extent  W are 
those who write in dominant languages, and preferably, who manage to be published 
by well-ŬŶŽǁŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞƌƐ ? ? ŽKƚŚĞƌƐǁŚŽ write mainly in their own languages and in 
their home countries are bound to be heard only by their local audience, however 
important and useful their work might have been for the rest of the world. (202) 
Concurring with Sarajeva, I would argue that, while I agree in principle with the universalist ethos 
put forward by Chesterman, such a view needs to be combined with a proper acknowledgement of 
global inequalities. Once that acknowledgement has taken place, there are three avenues open to 
us: firstly, we can work actively to counter the tendency for voices coming from less globally 
powerful institutions/nations/languages to gŽƵŶŚĞĂƌĚ ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ǁĞĐĂŶ ‘ƉƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůŝǌĞ ?ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ
theory, along the lines suggested by Kothari (2014), drawing on Chakrabarty (2007), recasting 
 ‘ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂƐ ‘tĞƐƚĞƌŶƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŽƌĞǀĞŶ ‘ŶŐůŽ-American translĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?; 
thirdly, we can assert, explicitly or implicitly, that such global inequalities do not matter. 
The first response is arguably the one that is emerging most clearly within TS, and was presumably 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƚƵƐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨƚŽƉŝĐĨŽƌƚŚŝƐĨŽƌƵŵ ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ(2014, 82) opening statement is 
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚŝƐďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉ ? “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂǀŝĞǁŝŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŽƵƌĨŝĞůĚ
is too Eurocentric, or too Western, and therefore needs to expand to incorporate non-Western 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ?), and the responses by Tymoczko and Kothari name some of the specific attempts to 
open up TS to traditions that currently lie outside the mainstream. Whether these concerns are 
characterized as ĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƵƌŶ ? (Tymoczko 2014, 104) or as Ă “ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŚƵƌŶŝŶŐ ? 
(Kothari 2014, 98), and whether they are driven primarily by a desire to uncover further data, the 
better to test hypothetical general principles, or by a desire to assign greater value to place and 
context, they are generally viewed positively by the academic community. The key issue, if this is our 
response, is the extent to which particularism, which is rooted in global hegemonies, can ever be 
overcome, and if it cannot be overcome, the point at which such counter-efforts might be deemed 
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sufficient. A number of respondents voice concerns along these lines: Wakabayashi (2014, 102), for 
example, notes the imbalance in keynote speakers at three conferences in 2013, and cautions that 
 “ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƐƵƌŐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƌĞ-envisioning TS is welcome, without greater representation from 
 “ŵŝŶŽƌ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐŝƚƌŝƐŬƐƐŵĂĐŬŝŶŐŽĨƚƌĞŶĚŝŶĞƐƐŽƌĞǀĞŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘KƚŚĞƌ ? ?.  Our response to 
the question of what might be deemed a sufficient opening up to alternative voices will depend on 
the overall framework within which we situate our translation studies research. If we adhere to the 
translation-as-science view promoted by Chesterman, then we might, for example, adopt a 
Popperian view that a theory can only ever be said to have not yet been falsified; the drive to further 
test a given theory will in this sense never be satisfied, although it may be deemed appropriate to 
put our energies into testing other theories at a given point (but who will decide that point, and 
which minor cultures will have been included or excluded by then?).  
 The second response, which is also finding a certain level of expression with TS, is arguably 
more radical than the first, since it entails, as Kothari (2014, 98) suggests, not simply an 
incorporation of other approaches into mainstream paradigms, but potentially the uncovering of 
 “ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞtĞƐƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐĂƐ ‘ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?, or indeed multiple such 
philosophies. In contrast to the openness to a substantial rethinking expressed by Chesterman, this 
second type of response does not have existing dominant models as its starting point: it is not a case 
of testing mainstream theory against a wider spectrum of contexts, but rather of countering the 
false universalism associated with dominant models by relabeling those dominant paradigms as 
paradigms that belong to specific times and places and languages, and exploring other paradigms 
and ideas on their own terms. Once this has been done, some level of comparison will undoubtedly 
follow, and ƚŚĞ “ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝǌŝŶŐƵƌŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ2014, 84) will be allowed to find some 
level of expression: but the search for general principles will come from many directions, not just 
one, and no one site of theoretical origin will be assumed to have primacy over the other. This kind 
of response has its precedent  W in vision if not in reality  W in non-scientific disciplines, such as 
postcolonial studies, and this is perhaps the moment to highlight one of my major points of 
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disagreement with Chesterman. As Wakabayashi (2014) also points out, ŚĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐ
based throughout on the assumption that TS is a scientific discipline; it is only in the final section, in 
the context of debates over the desirability or undesirability of a standardized TS terminology, that 
Chesterman (2014, 88) acknowledges tŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨd^ĂƐĂŶ “ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůŚƵŵĂŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? is 
ŶŽƚƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇĂůůǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?ŚĞƐƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĨĂĐƚ
appears to be linked to his concern that a clearer acknowledgement of the differences in perception 
between the empirical scientists and the hermeneƵƚŝĐŝƐƚƐŵĂǇůĞĂĚƚŽ “even more of a split in the 
ĨŝĞůĚ ? (88); in my view, however, acknowledging the interdisciplinarity of our field is crucial to clear 
thinking around questions of research aims and methodology, not least in the way in which these 
relate to universalism, both as a concept and as an ethos.   
Within these non-scientific fields, scholars such as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar and Judith Butler 
have sought to think through and problematize the notion of universalism itself, and many of their 
insights hold considerable relevance for TS. :ƵĚŝƚŚƵƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ(2000) attempt to articulate universality 
within a theory of hegemony, for example, addresses many of the issues around power and cultural 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂůƐŽŬĞǇƚŽĚĞďĂƚĞƐŝŶd^ ?,ĞƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇŵŝŐŚƚďĞ “ƌĞƐƚĂŐĞĚŝŶ
ƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐ W paradoxically, perhaps  W that some of the answers to 
the complexities surrounding the concept of universalism might be found not by looking outside the 
discipline of TS but deeper within it, particularly at the work that has been done in relation to 
translation and appropriation, or to translation and ideology. Another example of the ways in which 
discussions taking place within non-scientific fields may be of use to TS can be found in Etienne 
ĂůŝďĂƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐĐŽƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĞƋƵŝǀŽĐŝƚǇof the discourses of universalism. Balibar (2007) stresses the 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĂŶĚƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?ŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƚǇ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
simply adopting any given discourse. In TS, this might mean investing less of our energy into testing 
the validity of hypothetical universals, and paying more attention instead to the exclusions on which 
our universalist categories are built, or through which our universalist discourses are legitimized.   
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The third type of response to particularism outlined above may be one that few of us would 
ĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚǇĞƚŝƚĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƐĂŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŚĞƌe, for it has its precedent in the very field 
with which Chesterman aligns TS most closely, namely science. In an article debating 
ŵƵůƚŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?,ĂƌǀĞǇ^ŝĞŐĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐĂ
clear awareness of the issue of particularism and its relevance for scientific research when he 
argues: 
Universalists generally agree that funding mechanisms (and economic conditions and 
decisions more generally), and the gender, racial and ethnic make-up of the research 
community  W like other dimensions of culture  W exercise enormous influence on the 
actual conduct of research, and so the shape of scientific theorizing and the content of 
scientific theories (807) 
Siegel goes on to acknowledge both the socially constructed nature of Western Modern Science 
(WMS) and its superiority over other models:  
hŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝƐƚƐĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ŽtD^ŝƐƐŽĐŝĂůůǇĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂŶĚ “ŽŶůǇŽŶĞĂŵŽŶŐŵĂŶǇ
ǁĂǇƐŽĨĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůŝ ƚƐĂůƐŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ ?ĨƌŽŵ
among the variety of possible ways of understanding the world, WMS is the most 
successful way of understanding it extant, when success is measured in terms of the 
production of the testable, predictive, and explanatory theories which mark science at 
its best. (ibid.)  
Opponents of ^ŝĞŐĞů ?Ɛ view are likely to point out that this statement in essence argues that WMS is 
most successful when measured against WMS ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚ “mark[s] science at its 
best ?, but this overall view is nevertheless one which holds wide currency among the scientific 
community. For Siegel (810) ƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? “ǁe have no 
realistic alternative to the privileging of WM^ŝŶƚŚĞƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐƵƌƌŝĐƵůƵŵ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ “ǁĞĞŵďƌĂĐĞ
ŵƵůƚŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐŝŶĚŽing so that we meet our fundamental obligation to treat 
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students with respect ĂƐƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?would provoke strong disagreement among only 
among certain subsections of the scientific community.   
I doubt very much that Western TS would be happy to claim a parallel level of superiority for what 
might be termed WMTS (Western Modern Translation Science): those who operate within the 
translation-as-science framework would probably agree with Tymoczko (2014, 105) ƚŚĂƚ “translation 
studies is a young discipline and still needs to broaden its data base ? ?ǁŚŝůĞŚĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐŝƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚ
presumably disagree on principle. And yet there are indicators that a belief in the superiority of 
WMTS underlies the current make-up of the field, and even our efforts to open up the field to other 
traditions. <ŽƚŚĂƌŝ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “despite a fundamental difference in what may be 
the first principles, translation scholars in India and China are found paying  ? ? Žcontinuous homage 
ƚŽĨŝǆĞĚŝĚĞĂƐŽĨ ‘ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ? ‘ƚĞǆƚ ? ‘ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ?, Susam-^ĂƌĂũĞǀĂ ?Ɛ(2002, 201) argument 
ƚŚĂƚƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌǇƚĞŶĚƐƚŽ “ďĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ
 ‘ƉŽƐƚĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƚƐĞůĨŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐĂŶĂƐǇĞƚŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚin the 
ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚdǇŵŽĐǌŬŽ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?) comments on resistance to the international turn 
by some of those within positions of institutional authority could all be construed simply as evidence 
of the strength of the drive towards particularism in TS research, linked to the entrenchment of 
global power dynamics. It would also be feasible however, to take them as signs that the 
international turn in TS, like the embracing of multiculturalism in science, is seen primarily as a 
 “ŵŽƌĂůŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? (Siegel 2002, 810) rather than as a marker of true openness to serious 
epistemological challenge. True openness, or a true decentring of the discipline would, as Tymoczko 
ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ůĞĂĚƚŽĂ “ƌĞǀĂŵƉ ?ŝŶŐ Ž ?ŽĨ “ƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? ŽĨƌŽŵĚĂƚĂ
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ŝŵƉĂĐƚŝŶŐŽŶ “Ăůů
ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĂůůƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵƐŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ƚƐƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŝŵƉĂĐƚǁŽƵůĚ
also undoubtedly include our conceptualizations of universalism itself, leading to a greater 
awareness of the contradictions that inhere in its articulation, reinforcing its identity as a  “ƐŝƚĞŽĨ
ĐŽŶƚĞƐƚ ? ?ƵƚůĞƌ2000,  ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽƐĞ “ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? ?ĂƌĞǇĞƚƚŽďĞĨƵůůǇĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚ ? 
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